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Abstract 
Humor development is underpinned by children’s pragmatic abilities. This chapter will 
highlight the link between humor and pragmatics, demonstrating that understanding contexts 
and intentions is often key to interpreting humor. It will also discuss different theories of 
humor processing, including incongruity theories, behavioral theories, and pragmatic theories 
based on Grice’s maxims and Relevance Theory.  This chapter will detail research about the 
development of humor appreciation and production from infancy through adolescence, 
including children’s understanding of the pragmatics involved in joking. Finally, research on 
the development of humor in children with autism and Asperger syndrome will be examined, 
highlighting that humor is more difficult for children with pragmatic difficulties. 
Keywords: Humor; Incongruity; Grice; Relevance Theory; Non-literal; Intention; 
Comprehension; Production; Autism; Asperger syndrome;  
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The Pragmatic Development of Humor 
This chapter will demonstrate that humor development is underpinned by children’s 
pragmatic abilities. The following sections will (1) highlight the link between humor and 
pragmatics, (2) discuss different theories of humor processing, (3) discuss research on humor 
development, and (4) discuss research on the development of humor in children with autism 
and Asperger syndrome. 
 
Humor and Pragmatics 
Humor highlights a central aspect of pragmatics – that context and intentions are 
important in understanding utterances, above and beyond literal meaning alone. Consider a 
very basic joke, such as mislabeling an object (e.g., calling a cat a dog). Relying only on the 
literal meaning of the utterance does not properly communicate the message. An adult 
addressee might think a mistake was made, perhaps stemming from the selection of an 
unintended referring expression, which would lead to a breakdown of communication. A 
toddler could take the same view, or, given that they are constantly learning about the world, 
might take the utterance to mean that cats are literally called dogs. If we add a pragmatic 
layer, such as the intention to be humorous, and allow the audience to consider cues such as 
laughter to indicate this, the utterance takes on a new meaning – that of a joke, where saying 
something wrong communicates amusement. Thus pragmatic meaning, or the intended rather 
than literal meaning, is essential in communicating humor. 
For more complex jokes including spoken puns, such as “Police were called to a 
daycare where a 3-year-old was resisting arrest/a rest”, considering only one literal meaning 
would lead to a breakdown of communication; for example, why would a 3-year-old be 
arrested? However, by considering the intention to be humorous, one can combine the two 
meanings and a joke can be interpreted instead. 
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Humor involves creating implausible or ambiguous literal meanings which can be 
interpreted as amusing. There are other situations in which literal meanings are not always 
enough on their own, and for which pragmatic interpretations can help. These include 
pretense, irony, and metaphor (e.g., Filippova, in press, this volume; Hoicka, Jutsum, & 
Gattis, 2008; Pouscoulus, in press, this volume; Rakoczy, Tomasello, & Striano, 2004). 
Children understand pretense from the second year (e.g., McCune-Nicolich, 1981), various 
degrees of metaphor from 3 to 10 years (e.g., Gottfried, 1997; Pearson, 1990), and various 
degrees of irony from 4 to 10 years (e.g., Pexman & Glenwright, 2007; Recchia, Howe, Ross, 
& Alexander, 2010). What humor research adds is that children can learn about pragmatics in 
relation to literal ambiguities as early as the first year (e.g., Mireault, et al., 2012; Reddy, 
2001; Sroufe & Wunsch, 1972). This early development may be due to several factors. First, 
humor takes both physical and verbal forms, allowing children to consider pragmatics even 
before their verbal skills take off. For example, infants could see putting a sock in one’s 
mouth as a correct act or a mistake, depending on their knowledge of the concept “sock”. 
However when accompanied by laughter, infants can interpret the act as humorous, giving 
the act a new pragmatic meaning of a joke. Thus pragmatics may develop before other 
aspects of language. 
Second, the pragmatic interpretations that turn early humor production and 
comprehension into successful communications are relatively simple. Early humor points 
only to literal ambiguity, or wrongness of the act, paired with the intention to amuse (Hoicka 
& Gattis, 2008). Understanding pretense, irony, and metaphor is more complex. For example, 
one must also consider imagination in the case of pretense (Nichols & Stich, 2003). Irony 
involves considering complex mental states (e.g., Pexman & Glenwright, 2007). Finally, 
metaphor involves noticing literal overlaps between two concepts (e.g., Andrews, Rosenblatt, 
Malkus, Gardner, & Winner, 1986).  
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Third, using pragmatics to overcome literal ambiguity via humor could be more 
socially and emotionally rewarding than using pragmatics to understand pretense, irony, or 
metaphor. For example, the amygdala shows stronger activation for jokes suggesting positive 
rewards (e.g., Bekinschtein, Davis, Rodd, & Owen, 2011). This in turn could provide 
motivation to give a pragmatic meaning to a literal ambiguity, which may not always be 
present for pretense, irony, or metaphor. Humor may thus be one of the first instances in 
which children learn about pragmatics, and upon which more complex forms, such as irony, 
may build. 
 
Humor Theories 
Several theories explain how we process humor. These include non-pragmatic 
theories, such as incongruity and behavioral theories, and pragmatic theories, such as Gricean 
and Relevance Theories. Incongruity theories suggest we find humor in incongruities, where 
incongruity, at its most basic, is a discrepancy between what is expected and what actually 
occurs (e.g., Attardo, 1997; Deckers & Kizer, 1975; McGhee, 1979; Nerhardt, 1976; Shultz, 
1974, 1976). Deckers and Kizer (1975) tested whether incongruity predicted humor 
appreciation. Participants were given 0, 11, or 22 trials in which they compared a weight 
weighing 90 grams to weights ranging between 80 and 100 grams. Participants were then 
asked to compare the 90 gram weight to a 90, 270, or 630 gram weight. Participants’ facial 
expressions were coded for humor (smiling or laughter). They found that the more judgments 
made prior to the test trial, the more humorous the participants found the comparison. 
Furthermore, the heavier the weight, or more distant from the expected weight, the more 
humorous the participants found the comparison. Deckers and Kizer suggested an increase in 
incongruity increases humor response, and this only occurs if an expectation has been 
created. 
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Behavioral theories focus on laughter to identify when humor has been appreciated, 
without regards to cognitive or socio-cognitive processing. For example, several 
observational researchers have identified humor by noting when toddlers laugh (e.g., Johnson 
& Mervis, 1997; Loizou, 2005). Additionally, Hoicka and Akhtar (2012) found toddlers’ 
incongruous acts were more likely to be accompanied by laughter than their typical acts, 
suggesting laughter can be used as an identifier of humor to some extent. 
The above theories leave out an important aspect – the speaker’s intentions. For 
example, just because a sentence is incongruous does not mean the sentence was meant to be 
a joke – the speaker may have made a mistake, could be lying, pretending, or may hold a 
false belief (Hoicka et al., 2008). Similarly, laughter can occur for a variety of reasons that do 
not involve humor, such as tickling, laughter contagion, and due to banal comments (Provine, 
1992, 2004). Additionally, felt humor and laughter vary widely, from very strong correlations 
to negative correlations, due to various factors such as the type of humor (Ruch, 2005). 
Again, what is important is that to ‘get’ humor, it helps to understand the speaker’s intention. 
Grice’s Cooperative Principle and the attendant maxims (Quantity, Quality, Relation, 
Manner; Grice, 1989) suggest that people give an appropriate amount of information that is 
genuine, related to the conversation, and clear. Grice further suggests that if any of the 
maxims are violated, the listener can assume that the speaker is nonetheless being co-
operative and intended for them to draw an inference (a conversational implicature) about 
their departure from the expected form. For example, non-literal speech, such as irony and 
metaphor, involves violating the maxim of Quality (try to make one’s contribution one that is 
true), e.g., saying “Your room is a pig sty”. By violating the maxim of Quality while holding 
to the Cooperative Principle, another meaning, (e.g., that one’s room has the features of a pig 
sty, i.e., dirtiness) is implied (Grice, 1989).  
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Pragmatic theories have attempted to account for humor. Attardo (1993) notes that all 
of Grice’s maxims, and even more than one maxim at a time, can be violated to lead to a 
joke. For example, one could violate the maxim of Quantity (Attardo, 1993, p.541): 
 “Excuse me, do you know what time it is?” 
“Yes.” 
Or the maxim of Manner (Attardo, 1993, p.542): 
 “Do you believe in clubs for young men?” 
“Only when kindness fails.” 
However Attardo (1993) points out that in joking, one intends not only to violate 
conversational maxims, but also to flout the Cooperative Principle in general. The speaker 
chooses not to respond to the literal question asked, violating the Cooperative Principle. Thus 
Attardo (1993) points out a paradox – jokes are communicative, despite violating the 
Cooperative Principle. 
Variations on Grice’s Cooperative Principle and the attendant maxims have 
incorporated intention to explain how a joke could be a successful communication. For 
example, Grice (1989) noted that rules are needed in the case of non-natural communication, 
where the intended meaning does not match the literal meaning. This could include jokes. As 
non-natural communication, by definition, violates the main conversational maxims of 
Quality, Quantity, Relation, and Manner (Grice, 1989), non-natural communication could 
never be successful without further refinements. Grice made an attempt to account for non-
natural communication by considering the utterer’s meaning and intentions, such that (Grice, 
1989, p. 92): 
“U meant something by uttering x” is true iff, for some audience A, U uttered x 
intending: 
(1) A to produce a particular response r 
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(2) A to think (recognize) that U intends (1) 
(3) A to fulfill (1) on the basis of his fulfillment of (2) 
Thus in the case of a joke, such as calling a hat a shoe, the utterer means that it is not 
a shoe, intending the audience to laugh, intending the audience to recognize that the utterer 
intends the audience to laugh, and intending that the audience laughs because the utterer 
wanted the audience to laugh. It is also important to note that Grice left open the meaning of 
utterance to include not only verbal utterances, but also non-verbal communicative acts. 
Raskin (1985) put forward the Semantic-Script Theory of Humor (SSTH) which 
stipulates that a joke is (1) compatible with two different scripts, (2) the two scripts are 
opposite, and (3) the joke follows four maxims for the cooperative principle of non-bona-fide 
communication (Raskin, 1985, p. 103): 
(1) Quantity: Give as much information as is necessary for the joke 
(2) Quality: Say only what is compatible with the world of the joke 
(3) Relation: Say only what is relevant for the joke 
(4) Tell the joke efficiently. 
These alternative maxims allow jokes to be communicative even when they violate 
Grice’s Cooperative Principle. What is important to note is that embedded in this theory is 
the signalling of a joking context, which in turn, could be interpreted as a humorous 
intention. 
Another major account of pragmatic meaning, Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson, 
1995), suggests that listeners process utterances only once, knowing the utterance is relevant 
to them, as speakers must follow the principle of relevance. Listeners can use the context and 
speaker’s intention to interpret the meaning that is most relevant to them – a meaning that 
leads to greater positive cognitive effects, and avoids cognitive effort.  
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In the case of non-literal language, it is important to consider how the utterance 
relates to the speaker’s attitude. Thus an utterance could be processed as, for example, ironic, 
if the speaker’s attitude is expressed towards the utterance (echoic), and if that attitude is 
dissociated from the utterance (e.g., Sperber & Wilson, 1981; Wilson & Sperber, 1992). For 
example, if a 7-year-old was given 20 pounds, and said, “I’m rich!” we might assume that 
what he says is literal. His attitude is presumably not dissociated from his utterance – 20 
pounds is a lot of money for a 7-year-old! However if a 30-year-old was in debt by £20,000, 
and was given 20 pounds, and also said, “I’m rich!” then we can interpret this as ironic. The 
sentence echoes a perhaps previously unsaid sentence, reflecting a cultural norm of what is 
considered “rich”, which does not involve a debt of £19,980. However his real attitude is that 
he is still broke, which is dissociated from what he said. By considering speakers’ attitudes 
from the start, listeners can process sentences only once to assess the overall meaning. 
Yus (2003) has extended Relevance Theory to processing humor. He suggests we 
process humorous sentences already knowing that the intention behind them is to be 
humorous. Thus the speaker will signal a humorous frame. The frame could be signalled by 
cues, such as laughter or previous joking, or the form of the joke. 
In the same vein, developmental psychologists have considered social cognition to be 
an important part of humor (e.g., Reddy, 2001). For instance, to detect humor, and know that 
an act or utterance is not a mistake, one must understand intentions to be humorous, or at the 
very least, notice cues which indicate that the act or utterance could be humorous (e.g., 
Hoicka & Gattis, 2008; Leekam, 1991).  
Since several types of acts, such as pretending, lying, and using metaphor, also 
involve saying intentional falsehoods, an even more complex understanding of social 
cognition is needed to distinguish humor from these other forms. For example, jokes differ 
from lies in that, while both are intentional, the second order intentions differ such that jokes 
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are not intended to be believed, while lies are (Leekam, 1991). Tracking others’ knowledge 
can also help determine when someone is joking. For example, saying a falsehood knowing 
that the other person knows it is false would indicate a joke, while saying a falsehood 
knowing that the other person does not know it is false would indicate a lie (Sullivan, 
Winner, & Hopfield, 1995). Thus, like pragmatic theories, socio-cognitive theories suggest 
that one cannot simply rely on incongruity to detect humor, mainly because falsehoods can be 
said for a variety of reasons. Instead, both socio-cognitive and pragmatic theories rely on the 
joke being framed in such a way (e.g., through intention cues, prior knowledge) to show it is 
a joke. 
 
Humor Appreciation 
An important aspect that much developmental psychology research on humor 
development misses (e.g., Loizou, 2005; McGhee, 1979; Shultz, 1974, 1976; Sroufe & 
Wunsch, 1972) is that detecting jokes is a pragmatic, or socio-cognitive process. While even 
infants appreciate humor, it is not clear that they understand the pragmatic meaning behind 
jokes. They could just as easily laugh at a mistake, which would miss the actor’s or speaker’s 
pragmatic message, and which would show a lack of pragmatic-communicative skills. Recent 
research has begun to examine whether young children not only appreciate humor, but also 
understand the communicative intentions of the joker. 
Humor appreciation begins in the first year of life, and tends to be in response to non-
verbal stimuli. Sroufe and Wunsch (1972) looked at the types of stimuli that made infants 
laugh. Mothers presented auditory stimuli (e.g., mother using a squeaky voice), tactile stimuli 
(e.g., bouncing baby on knee), social stimuli (e.g., cloth in mother’s mouth), and visual 
stimuli (e.g., mother crawling on floor) to their infants. They recorded when 4- through 12-
month-olds laughed at each type of stimulus. They found that 4- to 6-month-olds laughed 
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10% of the time, 7- to 9-month-olds laughed 37% of the time, and 10- to 12-month-olds 
laughed 43% of the time. They also found that 7- to 9-month-olds laughed more than 10- to 
12-month-olds at auditory and tactile stimuli, while 10- to 12-month-olds laughed more than 
7- to 9-month-olds at social and visual stimuli. They suggested that what makes infants laugh 
is in line with their cognitive development, as infants’ vision and social interactions develop 
later than their tactile and auditory abilities. 
Sinnott and Ross (1976) showed 3- to 8-year-old children puppet-acted scenarios. 
Children of all ages chose incongruous (e.g., puppet walking across the stage by bouncing on 
its head) and what the researchers called aggressive (e.g., puppet walking across, tripping, 
and falling on its face) scenarios significantly more often than neutral scenarios (e.g., puppet 
walking across waving) as most humorous. However no difference was found between the 
aggressive and incongruous scenarios. They suggest both incongruity and aggression are 
factors in children’s humor appreciation. However aggression could be seen as socially 
incongruous in these scenarios. For example tripping and falling on one’s face is something 
unexpected by the puppet. 
While up to 3 years, toddlers tend to appreciate jokes that involve incongruity (i.e., 
something out of the ordinary or nonsensical) children start to appreciate what is termed 
resolution from 4 years, where resolution allows one to reframe an image or utterance so that 
it makes sense in a new context. Pien and Rothbart (1976) presented cartoons to 4- and 5-
year-olds. These cartoons either contained incongruity and resolution, or were altered to 
contain incongruity alone. Children found cartoons containing both incongruity and 
resolution funnier than cartoons containing incongruity only. This ability is a pre-requisite for 
the Semantic-Script Theory of Humor (Raskin, 1985), as the SSTH involves recognising two 
opposing scripts within the same act or utterance. 
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When humor is verbal, rather than visual, children do not understand resolution until 
8 years. Shultz (1974) showed three forms of a pun-based joke to 6- to 12-year-olds. The first 
form allowed one to notice incongruity as well as resolve the answer to the joke. The second 
form allowed one to notice incongruity, but did not provide a resolution. Finally, the third 
form contained no incongruity, but did allow resolution, e.g., (Shultz, 1974, p. 101).  
Why did the cookie cry? 
A.Because its mother was a wafer so long. (Incongruity + Resolution) 
B.Because its mother was a wafer. (Incongruity) 
C.Because he was left in the oven too long. (Resolution) 
Shultz found that while children 8 years and above found jokes containing both 
incongruity and resolution to be funnier than jokes containing incongruity or resolution alone, 
6-year-olds found jokes containing incongruity equally funny, regardless of whether or not 
they contained resolution. 
The above research shows what types of humor children appreciate, following 
behavioral and incongruity theories of humor. While research considering humor 
development from a pragmatic viewpoint is limited, the research to date is discussed below. 
Hoicka and Wang (2011) found that 15-month-olds differentiate humorous and sweet 
vocal cues, and meaningfully match these vocal cues to the appropriate actions. In one 
condition an experimenter gave sweet vocal cues (“Aww!” plus a sentence said with sweet 
intonation, i.e., lower, quieter, faster compared to humor, with a falling statement-like 
contour; following Hoicka & Gattis, 2012). When infants heard the sweet vocal cues they 
looked longer when the experimenter performed a humorous action (e.g., rubbing a toy cat on 
her head) versus a sweet action (e.g., stroking the toy cat); perhaps not surprising since the 
humorous action was quite unexpected. However, in a second condition an experimenter 
gave humorous vocal cues (laughter plus a sentence said with humorous intonation; i.e., 
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higher, louder, and slower compared to sweet, with a rising question-like contour; following 
Hoicka & Gattis, 2012). When infants heard humorous cues they looked longer when the 
experimenter performed a sweet versus humorous action. Thus, infants were not surprized by 
strange actions per se. Rather, they were surprized when a person’s actions did not follow 
their communicative cues. This suggests that from 15 months infants use humorous cues to 
create a humorous frame in which to interpret the pragmatic meaning of subsequent acts. 
Infants may thus expect people to intentionally act humorously after giving humorous 
intentional cues. 
Hoicka and Gattis (2008) found toddlers use laughter to infer that someone 
intentionally did the wrong thing. An experimenter modelled abnormal actions on objects 
(e.g., drinking from an upside-down cup) and said either “Whoops! Now you try” or 
“[laughs]. Now you try”. From 25 months, children copied the actions accompanied by 
laughter more often than those accompanied by “Whoops!” and corrected actions 
accompanied by “Whoops!” more often than those accompanied by laughter. Thus from 25 
months, toddlers use laughter to give the act a pragmatic meaning of “joke”. 
Shifting to verbal jokes, Hoicka and Akhtar (2011) found that if experimenters 
mislabeled objects (e.g., calling a cup, “oogle boo”), toddlers from 30 months of age 
mislabeled objects more often when experimenters laughed versus when they gave sincere 
expressions, (e.g., “There!”). This study dismisses the possibility that toddlers simply 
responded to unintentional markers (e.g., Whoops!). Thus from 30 months, toddlers use 
laughter to interpret the pragmatic meaning of verbal jokes.  
When comparing joking to ignorance, children as young as 3 years understand that 
jokers know the truth, but choose not to tell it (Hoicka, Butcher, Malla, & Harris, 2013). 
Three- to 5-year-olds watched one actor mislabel common objects (e.g., cup) while showing 
that she was joking (laughing, using a humorous intonation pattern, saying “I’m joking!”), 
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while another actor mislabeled objects while displaying ignorance (shrugging shoulders, 
saying, “I don’t know”). When children were shown novel objects, and each actor labeled the 
object with a novel word while being sincere, children trusted the previous joker over the 
previously ignorant speaker, and also judged that the previous joker knew the answer, while 
the previously ignorant actor did not. This was not due to children simply preferring the 
joker, or due to ignorance cues, as demonstrated by control conditions. 
Research using open-ended questions found similar results. In a study of 2- and 3-
year-olds, a speaker labeled objects falsely (e.g., calling a cup a shoe), and then the 
experimenter asked the children why the speaker had said that (Baron-Cohen, 1997). Most 
children reported mental states, often suggesting pretending or joking to explain the false 
label. Baron-Cohen’s study highlights that there are several reasons why children could think 
we might make falsehoods. To be certain that children have a pragmatic understanding of 
humor per se, and not just intentional falsehood, it is also important to determine whether 
children distinguish pragmatic meanings behind different types of falsehood, such as 
pretense, joking, lying, and metaphor. 
One way in which children track the pragmatic meaning of joking is through whether 
the person intends for a falsehood to be believed. Leekam (1991) tested 6- through 9-year-
olds on a story-based task in which a child falsely told his mother he made a painting either 
as a lie (not intending his mother to know the truth), or as a joke (intending his mother to 
know the truth). Children who distinguished jokes from lies also distinguished the second-
order intentions of the speaker, suggesting that understanding second-order intentions is 
important to determine the exact pragmatic meaning of a falsehood. 
Children also acknowledge that what other people know or do not know affects 
whether they are joking or lying. Sullivan, et al. (1995) read two stories to 5- to- 8.5-year-old 
children. In one story, a child lies, e.g., he says he has drawn a picture that he has not drawn, 
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knowing that his mother does not know the truth. In the other story, a child jokes, e.g., he 
says he has drawn a picture that he has not drawn, knowing that his mother knows the truth. 
They found that children’s understanding of second-order ignorance (understanding whether 
or not someone is aware of another person’s knowledge) was imperative to understanding 
whether the child was lying or joking. Thus children from around 5 years can use second-
order intentions and knowledge states to determine whether the pragmatic meaning behind a 
falsehood was a joke or lie. 
Recent research suggests that even toddlers are sensitive to differences between 
joking and pretending (Hoicka & Butcher, 2013). When parents said falsehoods (e.g., that a 
sponge or a toy chicken was a shoe) to joke or pretend, toddlers were more likely to endorse 
the actions that went with the false labels (e.g., putting the sponge or toy chicken on their 
foot) when parents were pretending versus joking. 
Thus children appreciate humor from the middle of the first year, and the types of 
humor that children appreciate change as they get older, reflecting cognitive and linguistic 
development. However, it is also important to consider when children understand that 
falsehoods are meant as jokes, as this indicates that children not only notice falsehoods, but 
also understand the pragmatic meaning conveyed by the speaker or actor. This begins as early 
as 15 months (Hoicka & Wang, 2011), and progresses through 6 years (e.g., Leekam, 1991).  
 
Humor Production 
According to parent reports, humor production starts in the first year, with most 
infants producing peek-a-boo jokes (Hoicka & Akhtar, 2012). Parents reported that 87% of 8- 
and 11-month-olds and 100% of 14-month-olds “clowned”, that is, they deliberately repeated 
actions to re-elicit laughter from others (Reddy, 2001). Such actions included screwing up the 
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face, wobbling the head, squeaks, splashing, teasing and copying others’ actions (such as 
grandma snoring).  
After the first birthday, most toddlers engage in funny actions, like pulling faces, and 
tickling or chasing others, according to parent reports (Hoicka & Akhtar, 2012). Toddlers in 
the second year have also been observed to make a variety of jokes such as looking through 
their legs, mis-pronouncing words, and putting all types of things in their mouths (sand, 
sponges, Loizou, 2005). From 19 months, toddlers copy jokes in which objects are misused, 
e.g., putting a boot on their hand (Hoicka & Gattis, 2008). One case study suggested that a 1-
year-old mislabeled objects, and even made puns (Johnson & Mervis, 1997). 
From 2 years, parents report that most children produce novel jokes (Hoicka & 
Akhtar, 2012). Most children’s joke repertoires expanded to include misusing objects, 
making incongruous statements (e.g., that dinosaurs lick the wall, or that dogs have three 
tails), and taboo topics (e.g., many poo jokes, Hoicka & Akhtar, 2012). From 2 years, 
children make novel jokes involving mislabeling in experimental settings (e.g., calling a cup, 
"goojoobooojoo”, Hoicka & Akhtar, 2011). From 3 years, parents report most children 
mislabel as a joke (Hoicka & Akhtar, 2012). Like humor appreciation, early research on 
humor production tends to be tied to cognitive and linguistic development, rather than 
pragmatic development. 
While research on humor production in older children does not focus on when 
different types of humor production emerge, research suggests that children continue to 
produce novel varieties of humor. Socha and Kelly (1994) asked children from 4 to 13 years 
what they might say to a friend or teacher who was sad to make them laugh. Four- to 8-year-
olds primarily made jokes which violated language or logical norms, e.g., "How does a chef 
make pasta? He uses his noodle." From 9 to 13 years children produced more jokes that 
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constituted decorum violations (e.g., defecation jokes), and politeness violations (e.g., sexist 
jokes). 
 A naturalistic study of 10- to 12-year-olds found that children produced a variety of 
humor types (Sanford & Eder, 1984). These included memorized jokes, which children 
shared with large, less familiar groups. Funny stories were shared amongst close friends. 
Practical jokes were played on close friends to increase bonds, but were played on 
acquaintances for bullying purposes. Finally, humorous behavior was carried out amongst 
small groups of girls to express taboo topics (e.g., sex). 
As in the case of humor appreciation, it is also important to consider when children 
intend to produce jokes. Thus we can consider whether children can convey the pragmatic 
meaning of joking. While little research exists on this, recent research suggests this could be 
as early as the first year. Parents report that infants cue their jokes with laughter, smiling, and 
looking for a reaction from the first year (Hoicka & Akhtar, in 2012). 
In observational research, 2- and 3-year-olds were significantly more likely to laugh, 
either with or without looking for a reaction, and significantly more likely to smile while 
looking for a reaction when producing incongruous versus normal actions and utterances with 
their parents (Hoicka & Akhtar, 2012). This suggests that toddlers were trying to 
communicate their falsehoods to their parents as humorous. Observational research also 
suggests that 3- to 5-year-olds were more likely to laugh when making an intentional versus 
incidental falsehood with their peers (Bainum, Lounsbury, & Pollio, 1984). Finally, 
experimental evidence found that 36-month-olds were more likely to laugh when mislabeling 
versus correctly labeling objects (Hoicka & Akhtar, 2011). Thus early on, children signal 
their jokes with laughter, smiling, and looking for a reaction, suggesting they are 
communicating their act as humorous to their audience, demonstrating an awareness of 
contextualising their jokes. 
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Origins of Humor 
Research suggests that both genetic factors and family environments play a role in 
forming people’s sense of humor. A twin study found that genetic factors account for the 
appreciation of aggressive humor, while family environment accounts for the appreciation of 
nonsense, satire and sexual humor (Wilson, Rust, & Kasriel, 1977). In contrast, a larger study 
of American twins found that affiliative (e.g., telling canned, or rehearsed, jokes) and self-
enhancing (noticing the funny things in life) humor were linked to genetic effects, while 
aggressive (making fun of others) and self-defeating humor were linked to family 
environments (Vernon, Martin, Aitken Schermer, & Mackie, 2008). However another large 
study of British twins found that all humor types linked to genetics, and not family 
environment (Vernon, Martin, Aitken Schermer, Cherkas, & Spector, 2008). Finally, an 
adoption study found that genetic factors dictated adolescents’ use of humor with friends, but 
not families (Manke, 1998). Across all of the above studies, it was also clear that non-shared 
environmental factors had great effects on types and sharing of humor. While this body of 
research gives us some (conflicting) clues about how genetics and family environments affect 
the development of sense of humor, it does not tell us how we learn about the overall 
pragmatic meaning of jokes, regardless of humor style. 
An increasing body of research in developmental psychology suggests that parents 
scaffold infants’ appreciation and production of humor early on. From around 7 months, 
parents report that infants repeat incongruous actions when parents laugh (Reddy, 2001). 
Thus laughter can signal to infants that their actions are non-serious and enjoyable. 
Longitudinal, observational research suggests that parents gradually scaffold their infants’ 
early clowning using a variety of cues (Mireault, et al., 2012). Researchers asked parents to 
“Do whatever you normally do to make your baby laugh or smile” at 3, 4, 5, and 6 months. 
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When parents tried to make their infants laugh or smile, they tended to perform clowning 
behaviors, such as pulling faces, and they paired this with cues such as laughter and smiling. 
Infants laughed and smiled in response both to parents’ clowning and to their cues, and this 
increased with age. Similarly, when infants clowned, parents responded in kind by smiling 
and laughing, or by clowning themselves, which increased with age. This suggests that while 
infants might not fully grasp humor at 3 months, parent-infant interactions scaffold their 
appreciation and production of humor. Thus infants come to learn which actions, paired with 
humorous cues, have the pragmatic meaning of “humorous”. 
Parents provide numerous cues to support toddlers in understanding when they are 
being humorous. For example, parents give linguistic and acoustic cues to mark when they 
are being funny versus sincere. Parents reading funny books to their 19- to 24-month-olds 
used more abstract language, that is, language referring to events outside the current context. 
They also used more disbelief language, that is, language which suggests they should not 
believe the joke. For instance, when parents read a joke such as “Mummy drinks baby’s 
bottle” parents said things like, “That’s not right” or “Who should drink the bottle?” (Hoicka, 
et al., 2008). Furthermore, when parents read jokes, they used more features of infant-
directed speech and used a rising linear contour which sounded like a question (Hoicka & 
Gattis, 2012). This suggests that parents made it easier for children to pay attention and 
notice a joke had been made, specifically framing the joke to help children notice it was a 
joke, and more specifically, what made it funny. Thus parents signal that the literal content of 
sentences like, “Mummy drinks baby’s bottle” should not be taken seriously. Rather, the 
pragmatic context dictates that it is a joke. 
A series of studies has further examined how parents cue humor to their toddlers, 
comparing humor not only to literal, but also pretense speech (Hoicka & Butcher, 2013). In 
these studies, the target sentences were always matched across conditions so that the literal 
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meanings stayed the same, but the pragmatic meanings varied. In one study parents read a 
book to their 15- to 21-month-olds in which the set-up of each page denoted a joking, 
pretending, or literal context, each followed by a target sentence that was the same across 
different versions of the book. In a play task with 16- to 20-month-olds, parents said a target 
sentence (e.g., “I’m having a drink”) which corresponded to a literal action (drinking), a 
pretend action (putting empty cup to mouth), or a joke action (putting cup to elbow). In a 
third task with 20- to 24-month-olds, parents said a target sentence (e.g., “This is a shoe”) in 
which they either literally labeled the object they were playing with (shoe), demonstrated 
pretensse (e.g., sponge), or joked (e.g., toy chicken). Across all three studies, parents showed 
more disbelief through their language and actions when joking compared to when they 
pretended or played literally. For example, they were most likely to say things like, “That’s 
not a shoe” in response to the same target sentence (“This is a shoe”) in the joking condition. 
Parents were also more likely to perform non-shoe actions (e.g., putting the object on their 
head) in the humorous condition. Thus parents used actions and utterances to convey 
different pragmatic meanings for the exact same sentences, even signalling differences 
between joking and pretending, which are only subtly different. Additionally, toddlers 
showed more disbelief through their actions during joking contexts, and toddlers in the object 
mislabeling task were more like to express their disbelief verbally by saying, “No” most often 
during joke trials. These results can be interpreted as suggesting that toddlers picked up on 
the different pragmatic meanings of joking, pretending, and literal utterances. 
 
Autism and Asperger Syndrome 
Autism is a disorder characterized by poor communication skills, social cognition, 
and understanding of pragmatics (e.g., Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985; Perner, Frith, 
Leslie, & Leekam, 1989). As humor relies on understanding pragmatics and social cognition, 
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it is not surprising that children with autism and Asperger syndrome find difficulties in 
appreciating and producing humor, specifically in a social or communicative context. 
Research on adults with Asperger syndrome found that they were just as likely to 
appreciate jokes based on visual puns as typical adults (Samson & Hegenloh, 2009). 
However they were less likely to appreciate semantic jokes, and even less likely still to 
appreciate jokes which relied on recognising false beliefs in others, than typical adults. The 
authors suggested that this was because adults with Asperger syndrome did not benefit from 
additional social cues to humor, while typical adults did. Thus while adults with Asperger 
syndrome appreciate humor, this is due to incongruity more generally, and not due to the 
communicative intentions of the joker. Further research found that children with high-
functioning autism and Asperger syndrome were less able than typically developing children 
to appreciate humor which was based on incongruity alone, perhaps suggesting that social 
cues could even help children to understand these types of jokes (Emerich, Creaghead, 
Gretha, Murray, & Grasha, 2003).  
Reddy, Williams, and Vaughan (2002) compared humor development in children with 
autism versus Down syndrome (DS), a disorder that does not affect affective engagement or 
social relations. They found that while children with autism laughed at tactile and slapstick 
humor as much as children with DS, they showed a distinct deficiency in responding to funny 
faces or socially inappropriate acts, laughing with others, or clowning, but an increase in 
unshared laughter. Thus while children with autism have some appreciation of humor, 
socially-based humor appears to be lacking. Furthermore, St. James and Tager-Flusberg 
(1994) found that children with autism created significantly fewer episodes of humor than 
children with DS. While not significant, when children with autism did create humor, the 
percentage of humor episodes that were clearly intentional were very low compared to 
children with DS. 
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Additionally, children with learning disabilities performed as well as typically 
developing children in determining that someone said a falsehood because they were 
pretending or joking (Baron-Cohen, 1997). However, children with autism did not tend to use 
mental states. Rather, they just emphasized that the label was wrong.  
Thus, from early on, children with autism do not appear to process humor in the same 
way as typically developing children and children with learning disabilities. While engaged 
in humor from infancy through adulthood, their appreciation of humor tends to be of the non-
social, non-pragmatic kind. They may find something funny if it violates their own 
expectations, but the pragmatic aspect of jokes - that they are intended by the joker - does not 
appear to be appreciated to the same extent by children and adults with autism or Asperger 
syndrome.  
Children with autism and Asperger syndrome have deficits in relation to 
communication skills, social cognition, and pragmatics. They also have specific problems 
processing the pragmatic aspects of jokes. Thus this body of research further highlights that 
typical pragmatic development may be important to typical humor development. 
 
Future Directions 
Research on humor development is in short supply, and there is even less research on 
humor development in relation to pragmatics. One key area that needs more research is when 
and how children come to understand the communicative intentions behind humor. Simply 
appreciating or producing humor does not get at one of the core aspects of humor – that it is 
generally a shared communicative event. Future research should use experimental methods to 
isolate how cues and context help children determine that an utterance is meant as a joke. 
While this chapter has pointed out that pragmatic understanding is important in the 
development of humor, it is not clear which pragmatic theories best account for humor 
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development. Current research on humor development does not take into account, for 
example, whether children process Grice’s maxims when interpreting jokes. However when 
considering humor in particular, pragmatic theories begin to merge. Grice (1989), Raskin 
(1985) and Yus (2003) all converge on a similar idea – that for a joke to be communicated 
effectively, the audience must know a priori that a joke was intended. For this to occur, the 
details of the theories are vaguely different. Grice stipulates that the speaker intends for the 
audience to know they are joking, while Raskin and Yus suggest the speaker signals a joke 
context or frame respectively. Future research should investigate this further. 
This paper has hinted at further complications in investigating children’s pragmatic 
understanding of humor – humor is not the only form of non-literal speech. Lying, 
pretending, irony, and metaphor are also non-literal (e.g., Hoicka, et al., 2008; Raskin, 1985). 
Part of understanding humor is understanding that a falsehood is intentional and creates 
amusement. To understand humor to its full extent, children must learn that the joker wants 
the audience to know that the falsehood is false, and for the audience to know that the 
speaker knows the utterance is false. Future research must further compare children’s 
understanding of different types of falsehood to ascertain whether children really understand 
separate concepts like joking, pretending, lying, irony, and metaphor, or whether they only 
understand more general concepts like, “intentional falsehood”. 
Finally, given the socially and emotionally rewarding nature of humor, there are 
opportunities to use humor as a tool to teach children about non-literal language. For 
example, both typically developing children and poor language comprehenders took part in 
an intervention in which they discussed jokes marked by ambiguity with their peers. This led 
to better reading comprehension in both groups (Yuill, 2007, 2009). Future research should 
examine whether engaging with humor early on leads to an increase in children’s ability to 
understand other forms of non-literal language such as metaphor and irony. 
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